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INTRODUCTION
EW Yorkers shoveled snow in Manhattan because a man sneezed
in China. Generations of high-school students struggled to take
the derivative of f(x)= (x3 + 2x)x3 because Newton's apple fell
from a tree. And a judge held in dissent that an al Qaeda terrorist suspect
could pursue non-statutory damages against the U.S. Attorney General'
because John Marshall failed to deliver William Marbury his justice of the
peace commission before midnight. 2
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2010. I thank Professor Anthony J.
Colangelo for his comments on a previous draft and for his guidance throughout my law
school career. The members of the SMU Law Review Association, particularly Kristen N.
Brown, provided outstanding publication and editorial assistance. My parents, Matti and
Urve Kiik, have been a constant source of inspiration, courage, and strength. With grati-
tude and love, I dedicate this Comment to them.
1. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sack, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI.
1945
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Chaos theory explains how small, initial changes in complex systems
cause unexpected results. 3 It explains how the flap of a butterfly's wings
in Brazil sets off a tornado in Texas4-or how a descending piece of fruit
caused me great anxiety in applied calculus. And it may even explain 5
how the key principle underlying Marbury v. Madison-ubi jus, ibi
remedium6-evolved from ancient legal maxim,7 to foundation for the ju-
dicial creation of a damages remedy, 8 to twenty-first century terrorist
tactic.9
The Supreme Court in Marbury held that even in the absence of a pri-
vate right of action, 10 "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, when-
ever he receives an injury."11 Or in other words, where there is a right,
there is a remedy. 12 Chief Justice Marshall may have anticipated that the
Court would one day apply this principle to create remedies for violations
of constitutional rights committed by federal officers. 13 A right without a
remedy, indeed, is really no right at all.14 But it is doubtful that even
Marshall could have predicted how an extension of ubi jus, ibi remedium
in American jurisprudence would prove advantageous to our adversaries:
by clever use of the Constitution's own weight and strength, al Qaeda
operatives have beseeched the judiciary to create remedies for their inju-
L. REV. 443, 447-48 (1989) (noting that the remedial principles of Marbury provide the
foundation for Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents as well other modern cases
inferring a private cause of action).
3. See EDWARD N. LORENZ, THE ESSENCE OF CHAOS 15 (1993).
4. Edward Lorenz, Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil set
off a Tornado in Texas?, Lecture on Global Atmospheric Research at the American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science (Dec. 29, 1972), in LORENZ, supra note 3, app. I, at
181-84.
5. Chaos theory extends beyond the physical sciences and is a useful explanatory and
predictive force for military strategy and economic and political analysis. See Susan E.
Durham, Chaos Theory for the Practical Military Mind, at vii (Mar. 1997) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Air Command and Staff College) (on file with author).
6. "Where there is a right, there is a remedy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1876 (9th
ed. 2009); see Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162 ("To withhold his commission, therefore,
is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.").
7. See Amar, supra note 2, at 447.
8. Id.; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971).
9. Lesson Eighteen in the al Qaeda training manual, entitled "Prisons and Detention
Centers," instructs al Qaeda operatives to "insist on proving that torture was inflicted on
them by State Security [investigators] before the judge." MILITARY STUDIES IN THE JIHAD
[HOLY WAR] AGAINST THE TYRANTS 137, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/
aqmanual.pdf (released by the U.S. Dept. of Justice Dec. 6, 2001); see also infra notes 17-22
and accompanying text.
10. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 172 ("It is true that the mandamus, now moved for,
is not for the performance of an act expressly enjoined by statute. It is to deliver a commis-
sion; on which subject the acts of Congress are silent.").
11. Id. at 163.
12. See supra note 6.
13. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.




ries, and, consequentially, have brought the Global War on Terror 15
home.16
To be sure, inviting enemies into federal courts is a prospect the judici-
ary has found "intolerable" for decades.' 7 In the World War II-era case
Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Supreme Court denied constitutional habeas
corpus rights to German nationals detained in Allied-occupied territory
partly to bar future vexatious claims.18 "Litigation," Justice Jackson noted
in Eisentrager, is a "weapon in unrestrained enemy hands." 19 But because
"[i]t is during our most challenging and uncertain moments .. . that we
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we
fight abroad, °2 0 reconciling the judiciary's reluctance to litigate national
security matters with its duty to safeguard essential liberties has taken on
paramount importance.2 1 As the Marbury Court observed centuries ago,
"[t]he government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
15. Following the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush addressed a
joint session of Congress and stated that "[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it
does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped, and defeated." President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session
of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001). The Bush Administration used the phrases
"global war on terrorism," "war on global terrorism," "war on terrorism," "war on terror,"
and "battle against international terrorism" to capture the scope of the terrorist threat it
perceived and the operations that would be required to confront it. JEFFREY RECORD,
BOUNDING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 1 (2003), available at http://www.globalse-
curity.orglmilitary/library/report/2003/record-bounding.pdf. In a rhetorical departure from
its predecessor's nomenclature, the Obama Administration adopted the term "Overseas
Contingency Operation" to describe largely the same activities. See DEPT. OF DEFENSE, FY
2010 BUDGET REQUEST SUMMARY JUSTIFICATION: OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
(2009) ("The FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations budget request funds U.S. mili-
tary operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and around the globe through September
2010."); Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, "Global War On Terror" Is Given New Name, Bush's
Phrase Is Out, Pentagon Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, at A4. Throughout this Com-
ment I use the phrase "war on terror" as short-hand convenience to describe what is more
accurately the "global struggle against modern transnational terrorist networks." Robert
D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443, 446 (2007).
16. President Bush often garnered support for the war on terror by reminding the
American people that fighting terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and beyond is pref-
erable to fighting them at home. See, e.g., George W. Bush, President of the United States,
Address at the Ohio State Highway Patrol Academy: President Discusses PATRIOT Act
(June 9, 2005), available at http://www.georgebush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2005/06/20050609-2.html; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950) ("It
would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to ... divert
his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at
home.").
17. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779; In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d
85, 105 (D.D.C. 2007).
18. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779. The Court in Eisentrager ultimately held that U.S.
courts had no jurisdiction over German nationals held at Landsberg prison. Id. at 781.
19. Id. at 779.
20. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004).
21. Id. at 539 (noting that courts must "pay proper heed both to the matters of na-
tional security that might arise in an individual case and to the constitutional limitations




But in a domain often inhospitable to reason, balancing security on one
hand and liberty on the other23 is no easy task. 24 The Supreme Court has
implemented emotionally detached methods to weigh these competing,
but equally important, interests in cases involving the procedural due pro-
cess rights for a U.S. citizen captured abroad as an alleged enemy com-
batant 25 and the extent to which the writ of habeas corpus runs to non-
U.S. citizens detained at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.26 Yet when courts must
determine whether violations of constitutional rights committed by fed-
eral officers in the course of the war on terror are actionable pursuant to
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 27-that is, whether the
judiciary should step in and create a damages remedy where one does not
exist 28-there is no comparable method to balance national security con-
cerns against the judicial recognition of an implied cause of action.
True, the creation of a damages remedy is quintessentially a legislative
function.29 And the judiciary's unwillingness to fashion a Bivens remedy
where a coordinate branch of government is "in a far better position than
a court" to decide whether a remedy should be provided 30 is well-under-
stood.31 The Supreme Court has observed numerous times that national
security determinations fall within the decision-making power of the po-
litical branches, 32 and thus where the adjudication of a claim would in-
trude and interfere with these decisions, the judicial creation of a non-
statutory damages remedy would be improper. 33
But while the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld34 and Boumediene v. Bush35
managed to afford some protection against constitutional rights viola-
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
23. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, Brief Remarks on the Supreme Court's Role After
9/11: Continuing the Legal Conversation in the War on Terror, 62 SMU L. REV. 17, 17
(2009) (discussing the "tug-of-war" between national security and individual rights during
the war on terror).
25. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532 (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
26. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008).
27. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
28. Id. at 389.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.").
30. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389, 391 (1983).
31. See infra Part I.B-C.
32. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 583 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting
that "the Court ... has correctly recognized the primacy of the political branches in the
foreign-affairs and national-security contexts"); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696(2001) (finding that there exists a "heightened deference to the judgments of the political
branches with respect to matters of national security"); see also Schneider v. Kissinger, 412
F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("Absent precedent, there could still be no doubt that deci-
sion-making in the fields of foreign policy and national security is textually committed to
the political branches of government."). I explore this division of power in greater detail
infra Part II.
33. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 181 (2d Cir. 2008).
34. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
35. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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tions, even for terrorist suspects,36 lower courts have refused systemati-
cally to recognize a cause of action for rights violations committed during
the war on terror.37 Professor Stephen I. Vladeck suggests that when
courts consider "amorphous" national security concerns as "special fac-
tors" counseling against a Bivens remedy,38 they "lend a judicial sanction
to even the most shocking government conduct in the name of national
defense. '39 His assessment warrants reflection: research shows that this
emerging "national security exception to Bivens"40 has prevented courts
on at least two occasions from even considering the merits of alleged vio-
lations of substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. 41 Or in
other words, contrary to the dictates of Marbury, injuries arising from
unlawful detention or extraordinary rendition42 have gone without a
remedy.4 3
Professor Vladeck offers three concerns he has with the national secur-
36. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
37. See infra note 41.
38. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies: The Newfound National Security
Exception to Bivens, A.B.A. NAT'L. SECURITY L. REP., July 2006, at 4-5 ("In what will
surely become known as the 'national security exception' to Bivens..."). Professor Robert
M. Chesney also has adopted this terminology. See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and
the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1267 n.12 (2007).
39. See Vladeck, supra note 38, at 5.
40. See id. at 4, 5.
41. See Arar, 532 F.3d at 192; In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94
(D.D.C. 2007). In a related case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed a German citizen's com-
plaint on the government's invocation of state-secrets privilege prior to ascertaining
whether he could state a Fifth Amendment Bivens action. See El-Masri v. United States,
479 F.3d 296, 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2007). But see Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1025
(N.D. Cal. 2009). After this Comment went into production, a California district court,
relying extensively on Arar v. Ashcroft, found no special factors counseling hesitation in a
Bivens action involving the allegedly unconstitutional treatment of an American citizen
residing in the United States as an enemy combatant. Id. at 1025-30. The court held that
Josd Padilla sufficiently alleged constitutional claims against a senior government official,
John Yoo, in part because the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), id. at
1026-27, the discretion afforded to coordinate branches of government in times of war, id.
at 1027-28, the effect the case would have on national security, id. at 1028, and the effect it
would have on foreign affairs and foreign relations, id. at 1029-30, did not preclude a Biv-
ens action, id. at 1030. This special-factors analysis is, on balance, more accurate than not.
The court erroneously declined to consider the AUMF, a joint-congressional resolution, as
a special factor, see id. at 1026-27; infra note 230, but correctly rejected John Yoo's asser-
tions that the AUMF's delegation of authority to the president and arguments that essen-
tially amounted to an invocation of the state-secrets privilege should counsel against
Padilla's Bivens action, see Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1027-28; infra note 231. Unfortu-
nately, space and publication constraints do not permit a more comprehensive examination
of Padilla v. Yoo, and thus where possible, I devote some attention to it in the margins.
42. The government's extraordinary rendition policy is a supposed clandestine CIA
program whereby suspected terrorists are sent to foreign countries for interrogation and
detention otherwise not permitted in the United States. See Arar, 532 F.3d at 192; El-Masri
479 F.3d at 300. This program, however, is not a part of official government policy. See
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
43. Lesson Eighteen in the al Qaeda training manual, entitled "Prisons and Detention
Centers," instructs al Qaeda operatives to "insist on proving that torture was inflicted on
them by State Security [investigators] before the judge." MILITARY STUDIES IN THE JIHAD
[HOLY WAR] AGAINST THE TYRANTS, supra note 9, at 137. In light of this strategy, this
Comment will continue to refer to these injuries as "alleged" or "suspect." The issues I
focus on relate to getting to the merits of the case, not the merits themselves.
2009] 1949
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ity exception to Bivens.44 First, Congress has not provided a remedial
mechanism for injuries incurred as a result of unlawful detention or ex-
traordinary rendition. 45 The Supreme Court has never suggested that
congressional inaction forecloses Bivens relief, and, according to Profes-
sor Vladeck, the recognition of a Bivens action is a particularly appropri-
ate check on unconstitutional governmental action.46 Second, the
national security exception defers disproportionately to executive branch
determinations, and the Executive has no discretion to violate the Consti-
tution, even in times of war.47 And third, although not the original intent
of Bivens,48 the exception "eviscerate[s]" its role as a deterrent for uncon-
stitutional actions by federal officers. 49
The issues raised in Professor Vladeck's commentary suggest that
lower courts are abdicating their responsibility to vindicate constitutional
rights50 when they consider Bivens actions implicating the war on terror.
Given that recent Supreme Court pronouncements have managed to bal-
ance safety and liberty even in times of national challenge, this news is
troubling. But what is equally disturbing is the appearance that the "faith-
ful guardians of the Constitution" 51 have succumbed to the siren song of
security:52 by withholding a remedy for a "violation of a vested legal
right" 53 "in the name of national defense," 54 the judiciary has adopted a
"blunderbuss" 55 approach to denying the enforcement of the very consti-
tutional rights "for which we fight abroad. '56 Because the United States
is a "government of laws, and not of men, '57 adhering to a sweeping ex-
ception to remedial relief for constitutional rights violations simply can-
44. See Vladeck, supra note 38 (relying entirely on Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 250).
45. Id. at 5.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Constitution contains no explicit provision for its own suspension during
times of emergency. The only clause that refers to the suspension of individual rights is the
Suspension Clause, which provides, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended unless, when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
48. The Supreme Court in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko noted that, "[t]he
purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional
violations." 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). Bivens itself, however, was not mainly concerned with
deterrence. See infra Part I.C.
49. See Vladeck, supra note 38, at 5.
50. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring) ("[T]he judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of
constitutional interests ... ").
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
52. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-65 (1963) ("The imper-
ative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due process under the gravest of
emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the
pressing exigencies of crisis, that there is the greatest temptation to dispense with funda-
mental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit government action.").
53. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
54. See Vladeck, supra note 38, at 5.
55. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 212 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sack, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
56. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004).
57. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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not be the rule. What courts are lacking is a way to separate out and
distinguish amorphous national security concerns in a Bivens analysis.
What is missing is a way to balance Bivens during the war on terror.
This Comment attempts to provide such a method. It deconstructs the
Bivens national security exception and introduces a balancing mechanism
that I call the Bivens national security exception continuum.58 Since Con-
gress is the political branch entrusted with the institutional competence to
create private rights of action and prescribe remedies, 59 by measuring
amorphous national security matters by congressional participation in the
decision-making process, the continuum offers a more balanced way to
conduct a Bivens analysis for injuries arising from the war on terror and,
in some cases, leaves open the possibility for judicially manufactured
relief.60
In brief, Bivens prescribed a framework for the judicial recognition of
an implied cause of action against the backdrop of congressional defer-
ence to the creation of a damages remedy. The continuum approach I
propose, therefore, is a function of the Legislature's participation in the
national security decision-making process. It shows that the greater the
congressional involvement in a national security matter, the more likely it
should be considered a special factor counseling against Bivens relief. In
contrast, because the Executive lacks the institutional competence to cre-
ate private rights of actions and prescribe remedies, the closer a national
security matter is to a purely executive function, the less likely it should
be considered a special factor, and a Bivens action may be allowed to
move forward. The continuum approach does three things. First, it re-
turns courts to the original intent of Bivens as an inquiry into whether
Congress is in a better position than the judiciary to create a damages
remedy. Second, it capitalizes on the newfound interest-based balancing
approach the Court has adopted when considering Bivens actions follow-
ing the September 11th attacks. And third, by addressing Professor
Vladeck's three concerns, it brings courts back to their primary duty-to
vindicate constitutional rights.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I examines the origins of the
national security exception. It describes Bivens relief and the procedures
courts have implemented to determine whether to create a damages rem-
edy. This part pays particular attention to the special factors that have
counseled against the recognition of an implied cause of action in matters
involving the coordinate branches of government. Next, Part II uses the
special-factors analysis in Arar v. Ashcroft6 l as a tool to separate out and
distinguish amorphous national security concerns by quantum of compe-
58. See infra Part III for a diagram of the Bivens national security exception
continuum.
59. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting) ("Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities
and competence for that task-as we do not.").
60. See, e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
61. 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
2009] 1951
SMU LAW REVIEW
tence. This part shows the erroneous progression from congressional-cen-
tric to executive-centric special factors courts have considered under a
Bivens analysis. Part III introduces the Bivens national security exception
continuum. It explains how courts should only consider national security
concerns as special factors when congressional action dominates the mat-
ter. This approach harmonizes the original intent of Bivens as a function
of separation of powers principles with the more modern, policy-driven
approach courts have been implementing under the special-factors doc-
trine. Finally, I conclude by highlighting why the analysis is both useful
and normatively sound in cases that implicate the war on terror and
beyond.
I. ORIGIN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
The national security exception to Bivens, while self-evident, is perhaps
misnamed. When courts consider national security concerns in a Bivens
analysis, they do so according to the special-factors doctrine. 62 As such,
the national security exception is less of an exception to Bivens relief and
more of a special factor counseling-albeit absolutely 63-against the cre-
ation of new federal remedies.64 But what exactly is a "special factor"?
How did Justice Brennan's dicta at the end of his opinion in Bivens take
on such great significance in the way courts approach whether to create a
non-statutory damages remedy? How have subsequent Bivens actions in-
terpreted this cryptic, cautionary note, and in what ways have they
shaped the special-factors doctrine? And why have judicial attitudes to-
ward special factors progressed from a simple examination of congres-
sional action to a more intensive scrutiny of policy ramifications? This
part seeks to answer those questions by reviewing the origins of the judi-
cial recognition of an implied cause of action under Bivens,65 examining
the history of how courts have identified special factors prior to the Sep-
tember llth attacks, 66 and distilling what special factors have meant ever
since. 67
A. BIVENS v. Six UNKNOWN FEDERAL NARCOTICS AGENTS
The Supreme Court in Bivens created a non-statutory damages remedy
for violations of the Fourth Amendment by agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics. 68 Webster Bivens claimed that that six federal officers en-
tered his home without a warrant, "manacled" him in front of his family,
and arrested him for alleged narcotics violations all without probable
cause.69 The search caused Bivens great "humiliation, embarrassment,
62. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
63. But see Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
64. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
65. Infra Part I.A.
66. Infra Part I.B.
67. Infra Part I.C.
68. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
69. Id. at 389.
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and mental suffering." 70 As a result of what he claimed was unlawful con-
duct, Bivens sought money damages from each of the officers. 71 The dis-
trict court dismissed the action for, among other things, failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, 72 and the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed. 73 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, how-
ever, and relying largely on Marbury v. Madison, held that Bivens's
"complaint state[d] a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment, [and
he] is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered
as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment.
74
Although the U.S. Constitution vests Congress with legislative power,75
Bivens held that, in appropriate circumstances, the Constitution itself
provides an implied cause of action for its own violation by federal of-
ficers.76 Following the Civil War, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which created a damages rem-
edy for constitutional rights violations committed by state officials.77 Vic-
tims of constitutional misconduct by federal officials, however, had no
such statutory remedy. The Bivens Court thus sought to protect individu-
als from constitutional rights violations suffered at the hands of federal
officials the same way § 1983 protects against injuries by state officers. 78
Bivens therefore stands for the proposition that an injured plaintiff may
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts to vindicate a violated consti-
tutional right against the offending federal official. 79
This landmark case had the potential to open the "floodgates" of con-
stitutional tort litigation.80 The Supreme Court in fact readily demon-
strated its power and authority by granting itself the ability to judicially
manufacture a damages remedy. But extensions of Bivens relief have
been rare. The Court observed some time ago that its "decisions have
70. Id. at 389-90.
71. Id. at 390.
72. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 276 F. Supp. 12, 14, 16 (E.D.N.Y.
1967).
73. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 409 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1969).
74. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803).
75. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
76. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 401-02 (Harlan, J., concurring).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....").
78. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 585 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Thirty-six years ago, the Court created the Bivens remedy. In doing
so, it assured that federal officials would be subject to the same constraints as state officials
in dealing with the fundamental rights of the people who dwell in this land.").
79. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 (1978) ("Bivens established that compen-
sable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could be vindicated by a suit for dam-
ages invoking the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts ... ").




responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended
into new contexts."81 Over the last forty years, the Court has extended
Bivens relief into only two new contexts, and the most recent extension
was nearly thirty years ago.
Over a decade after Bivens, the Supreme Court in Davis v. Passman
recognized an implied cause of action for violations of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause for a victim of sexual discrimination.82 Shirley
Davis served as a deputy administrative assistant to then-Louisiana Con-
gressman Otto E. Passman.83 Passman terminated Davis's employment
because it "was essential that the understudy to my Administrative Assis-
tant be a man."' 84 Seeing no available relief in equity or under state law,85
the Court carefully recognized Davis's Bivens action and reversed the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion.86 Justice Brennan, who had au-
thored Bivens, noted in Davis that it was irrelevant that Congress had not
provided a remedial mechanism because "the question of who may en-
force a statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of who
may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution. ' 87 According to
Brennan, the Court could enforce the Fifth Amendment, since it is a con-
stitutional right, regardless of whether Congress had enacted a statutory
remedy. 88
Just one year later in Carlson v. Green, the Court extended Bivens to
violations of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause. 89 The mother of a deceased prisoner brought suit against federal
prison officials, alleging that her son's untreated ailments ultimately led
to his death.90 It was again Justice Brennan who acted on behalf of the
Court, this time affirming both the district court's and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals's assessments that a Bivens action was available. 91 Ac-
cording to the Court, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not pro-
tect constitutional rights sufficiently under these circumstances, there was
no indication from Congress that the FFCA should be the exclusive rem-
edy for this type of action, and, therefore, Bivens relief was an appropri-
ate exercise of judicial power. 92
But Carlson was the second and last time the Supreme Court extended
Bivens. Justice Powell, who dissented in Davis93 but concurred in judg-
81. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988) (refusing to recognize Bivens relief
for wrongful termination of Social Security benefits).
82. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 243-44 (1979).
83. Id. at 230.
84. Id. at 230 & n.3.
85. The Court noted that Congress had failed to create a damages remedy for the
violation of Davis's right. Id. at 232-33.
86. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. 1978).
87. Davis, 442 U.S. at 240-41.
88. Id. at 242.
89. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
90. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16.
91. Id. at 24.
92. Id. at 23; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006).
93. Davis, 442 U.S. at 251-55 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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ment in Carlson,94 wrote separately, cautioning against a further exten-
sion of Bivens.95 His analysis in Carlson stressed that "a court must
entertain a Bivens suit unless the action is 'defeated' in one of two speci-
fied ways:"' 96 either Congress "explicitly declared its remed[ies] to be a
substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed [it] as
equally effective" 97 or "if 'special factors' [that] counsel 'hesitation' "98
are present.99
Later Bivens progeny clarified the structure of this fact-sensitive, two-
step inquiry. 100 First, a court will examine whether an alternative dam-
ages remedy exists or there is an explicit congressional prohibition
against one. 10 1 Either would bar the judicial recognition of an implied
cause of action. Second, a court must consider "special factors" that
would "counsel hesitation" and foreclose the availability of a remedy.102
These special-factor considerations do not concern "the merits of the par-
ticular remedy [being] sought," but rather involve "the question of who
should decide whether such a remedy should be provided. '10 3
As previously noted, the phrase "special factors" comes from Justice
Brennan's concluding remarks of his Bivens majority opinion.10 4 He con-
ceded that there may be certain "special factors" under which an other-
wise valid Bivens claim might be nonjusticiable. 10 5 Although he did not
define these special factors, Justice Brennan cited two "pre-Bivens" ac-
tions where the Court declined to recognize an implied cause of action.106
First, in United States v. Standard Oil Co., the Court refused to infer a
damages remedy because Congress was in a better position than the judi-
ciary to open up the "federal purse.' 07 And second, in United States v.
Gilman, the Court likewise refrained from recognizing an implied cause
of action because the claim involved complex policy questions committed
to the executive and legislative branches of government.108 The synthesis
of these two holdings foreshadowed the core of the original special-fac-
tors doctrine: only Congress should decide whether to create a damages
94. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 25-30 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Powell's
concurrence, joined by Justice Stewart, accounted for the sixth and seventh votes. Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed dissenting opinions.
95. Id. at 26-27.
96. Id. at 26.
97. Id. at 26-27 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (internal citations omitted).
98. Id. at 27 (internal citations omitted).
99. It was also Justice Powell who wrote, "The Judicial Branch should not decide is-
sues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the politi-
cal branches reach a constitutional impasse." Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring).
100. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983).
104. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971).
105. Id. at 396-97.
106. Id. at 396.
107. Id. (citing United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947)).
108. Id. (citing United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 509 (1954)).
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remedy when the claim implicates political branch matters. Subsequent
Bivens actions gave greater definition to the special-factors doctrine, and
the remainder of this part examines what courts have considered as spe-
cial factors in matters involving the coordinate branches of government.
B. SPECIAL FACTORS IN THE 1980s
The Supreme Court has been particularly hesitant about allowing Biv-
ens claims to move forward if the action implicates separation of powers
principles. This reluctance presumably stems from Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion in Bivens where he noted that "the question of judicial
power to grant Bivens damages is . . . whether the power to authorize
damages as a judicial remedy for the vindication of a federal constitu-
tional right is placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in Congress'
hands." 10 9 Or in other words, whether the judicial creation of a damages
remedy is an ultra vires exercise of power turns on the Constitution's ex-
plicit grant of that power to another branch of government. 110 Justice
Harlan's concurrence deserves attention since it created a majority for
the Bivens Court.
The separation of powers doctrine allocates power horizontally among
the three branches of government-the legislative, the executive, and the
judicial. Although studied most frequently in terms of executive en-
croachment on the Legislature"1 or legislative encroachment on the Ex-
ecutive,112 separation of powers principles also bar the judiciary from
adjudicating matters solely within the purview of the political branches.
The doctrine is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution itself, but as Jus-
tice Brandeis put it in his dissent in Myers v. United States:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the conven-
tion of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by
means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people
from autocracy.' 13
Because the separation of powers doctrine operates as "a self-executing
safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at
the expense of the other,"114 its role in a Bivens analysis is particularly
109. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 400-02 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
110. See id.
111. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587
(1952) (holding that President Truman's Article I powers did not permit him to take pos-
session of private property during the Korean War).
112. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (holding the one-House legislative
veto to be an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power).
113. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 85 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976). "This Court has not hesitated to enforce
the principle of separation of powers embodied in the Constitution when its application




salient: 115 Bivens relief is improper when a coequal coordinate branch of
government, namely Congress, is in a better position than the courts to
create a damages remedy.11 6 Past considerations of Bivens involving the
three branches of government show how separation of powers principles
figured into the Court's refusal to recognize an implied cause of action in
the 1980s.
For example, the Supreme Court in Bush v. Lucas held that a First
Amendment Bivens remedy did not exist in situations "aris[ing] out of an
employment relationship that is governed by comprehensive procedural
and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United
States.11 7 Decided five years after Carlson, this was the first time that
the Court declined to extend Bivens into a new scenario.1 1 8 Bush, a dis-
gruntled NASA aerospace engineer, stated to the media that his job was
"a travesty and worthless."' 119 Both television and print sources broad-
casted these statements, and as a result of the negative publicity, Bush's
superiors demoted him.120 Seeing no alternative remedial mechanism,
Bush sought Bivens damages for compensation.
1 21
The Bush Court cautiously approached its consideration of an exten-
sion of Bivens. Justice Stevens writing for the entire Court noted that
"our power to grant relief that is not expressly authorized by statute ... is
to be exercised in the light of relevant policy determinations made by the
Congress."1 22 The Court in its special-factor analysis determined that it
indeed was preferable for Congress, rather than the judiciary, to evaluate
the impact of damages suits for alleged violations of a federal employee's
First Amendment rights.12 3 The Court did not identify merely one special
factor, but instead indicated that "a good deal of history"1 24 counseled
against the recognition of a new implied cause of action. 125 And the
Court went on to explain the purpose of the special-factors doctrine in
separation of powers language: the doctrine does "not concern the merits
of the particular remedy that was sought. Rather, [special factors] relate[
] to the question of who should decide whether such a remedy should be
provided.112 6 Special factors, therefore, are inquiries into how non-judi-
cial determinations are made and whether "there are reasons for allowing
115. See generally id.
116. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983).
117. Id. at 368.
118. Id. at 389-90.
119. Id. at 369.
120. Id. at 369-70.
121. Id. at 372-73.
122. Id. at 373.
123. Id. at 389.
124. Id. at 378. It is not uncommon for courts to identify several potential special fac-
tors when conducting a Bivens inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 685-
86 (1987); Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 181-83 (2d Cir. 2008); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1025-30 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
125. Bush, 462 U.S. at 378-80.
126. Id. at 380.
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Congress to prescribe the scope of relief that is made available" 12 7 in
those situations.
In the Supreme Court's second unequivocal denial of Bivens relief, a
unanimous Court in Chappell v. Wallace refused to create a damages rem-
edy for constitutional rights violations committed by military officers. 128
Minority enlisted naval personnel claimed that their commanding officers
"failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low
performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual severity" be-
cause of their "race, color or previous condition of servitude."'1 29 The
Court identified in its special-factors analysis that a "special status" exists
for the military. 130 Because Congress enjoys "plenary control"' 31 over
military discipline, this separation of powers assessment precluded the ju-
diciary from permitting members of the armed forces to bring suits
against superior officers for damages.' 32
And third, in United States v. Stanley, the Court held that a Bivens rem-
edy was unavailable to a former army serviceman who "violently beat his
wife and children" because federal agents had administered a halluci-
nogen narcotic to him without his knowledge.' 33 The special factors pre-
sent here likewise drew directly from separation of powers principles:
"uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary [was] inappro-
priate."'1 34 Similar to the special-factors analysis in Bush,135 the Stanley
Court identified several factors which counseled against the judicial rec-
ognition of an implied cause of action: the military's position in society,
its separate system of discipline and justice, and an explicit constitutional
grant of power to Congress to govern the armed forces. 136 The Court
then reaffirmed the reasoning behind Chappell that these special factors
established Congress's primacy in this field. 137 According to the Stanley
Court, because Congress had not authorized judicial intervention into
military discipline, the Legislature retained sole authority over these mat-
ters and, thus Bivens relief was inappropriate. 138
What the early Bivens progeny tells us is that courts placed a premium
on the "bedrock principles of separation of powers [that] foreclosed judi-
cial imposition of a new substantive liability.' 39 In Bush, the Court noted
that Bivens inquiries must focus on which branch of government should
decide whether a remedy should be provided. 140 In Chappell, the Court
127. Bush, 462 U.S. at 380.
128. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297-98 (1983).
129. Id. at 297.
130. Id. at 303-04.
131. Id. at 301.
132. Id. at 300.
133. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671, 685-86 (1987).
134. Id. at 683.
135. Supra note 124 and accompanying text.
136. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682-83.
137. Id. at 683.
138. Id. at 679-80.
139. Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001).
140. Supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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applied this understanding and refused to recognize an implied cause of
action where Congress enjoyed "plenary control."'1 41 And in Stanley, the
Court again denied Bivens relief because, among other things, the Consti-
tution had granted Congress the ability to govern the armed forces: as in
Chappell, the Legislature retained authority over military matters and
therefore, as in Bush, Congress was in a better position to determine
whether a damages remedy should exist.1 42
But while the Court in the 1980s focused its "special factors counseling
hesitation" analysis upon Congress's participation in the creation of dam-
ages remedies, more recent Bivens actions have treated "special factors"
as any concern the Court might find important to the creation of a cause
of action.' 43 Or to borrow a phrase from Professor Laurence H. Tribe,
twenty-first century Bivens jurisprudence suggests that there is no longer
a "specialness" in a "special factors" inquiry.144 To understand what Pro-
fessor Tribe's assessment means, this Comment will now examine how the
Court's Bivens analysis moved away from an examination of congres-
sional action pursuant to separation of powers principles and moved to-
ward the consideration of policy ramifications instead.
C. SPECIAL FACTORS AFTER SEPTEMBER liTH
The Supreme Court's approach to the special-factors doctrine under-
went a paradigm shift after the September 11th attacks. The second step
of the contemporary Bivens analysis is now more concerned with balanc-
ing competing interests than with adhering to separation of powers prin-
ciples.' 45 This new way of framing the special-factors examination
suggests that as congressional inaction becomes more pronounced, courts
should more actively engage in a policy-driven approach to the creation
of a damages remedy rather than recognizing an implied cause of action
exclusively to provide relief.' 46 Because there is no statutory means of
redress for injuries arising from unlawful detention or extraordinary ren-
dition during the war on terror-and because the idea of enacting such
legislation is perhaps politically unpalatable 147-looking at the way
courts have contributed to the special-factors doctrine since the Septem-
ber 11th attacks provides unique insight into how the national security
exception to Bivens became the dominant rule.
In November 2001, for example, the Supreme Court in Correctional
Services Corp. v. Malesko refused to recognize an implied cause of action
141. Supra note 132 and accompanying text.
142. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
143. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 554-55 (2007); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70-74.
144. Laurence H. Tribe, Death By A Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without
Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 23, 69 (2007).
145. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 554.
146. Tribe, supra note 144, at 70.
147. See Vladeck, supra note 38, at 5 (noting that "Congress, as the instrument of popu-




for Eighth Amendment violations against a private corporation acting in
concert with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 148 Correctional Services Cor-
poration (CSC) operated a halfway house in New York where John E.
Malesko, who had been convicted of securities fraud, was sentenced to
reside for one-and-a-half years. 149 According to the complaint, a CSC
employee forbade Malesko, who had a known history of heart disease,
from using an elevator to get to his living quarters. 150 As a result of this
prohibition, Malesko suffered a heart-attack and injured his ear while
climbing the stairs to his fifth floor residence. 151 Three years later, he
filed suit against the CSC employee and several other unnamed employ-
ees seeking compensatory and punitive damages. 152 The district court
construed the action as a Bivens claim and dismissed it in its entirety.'
53
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and controversially reasoned that there are times when even private com-
panies should be subject to Bivens relief.154
The Supreme Court, however, declined to extend Bivens and held that
private entities are not subject to a Bivens action.1 55 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist noted that there existed an alternative remedial mechanism for
Malesko to pursue monetary damages, and thus an extension of Bivens
would be an inappropriate exercise of judicial power.1 56 But curiously,
the Court went further to hold that "[t]he purpose of Bivens is to deter
individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations."'' 5 7
This language in Malesko is puzzling, especially when viewed alongside
Justice Harlan's fifth-vote concurrence in Bivens. In concurring with the
judgment, Justice Harlan observed that:
[C]ompensatory relief does not turn simply on the deterrent effect
liability will have on federal official conduct. Damages as a tradi-
tional form of compensation for invasion of a legally protected inter-
est may be entirely appropriate even if no substantial deterrent
effects on future official lawlessness might be thought to result.' 58
Therefore, instead of showing judicial restraint, as Chief Justice Rehn-
quist claimed when he refused to recognize an implied cause of action, by
casting Bivens as a deterrent, the Malesko Court actually injected itself
into policy considerations reserved for the political branches. To put it
another way, contrary to the original intent of Bivens, the Malesko Court
moored itself to the idea that a special-factors analysis includes inquiries
148. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 63.
149. Id. at 63-64.
150. Id. at 64.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 64-65.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 65.
155. Id. at 66 & n.2.
156. Id. at 71-73.
157. Id. at 70.




into whether the judicial creation of a damages remedy might serve as a
deterrent against unconstitutional conduct by federal officers. But that
has never been the test.
In June 2007, the Court in Wilkie v. Robbins declined to recognize an
implied cause of action for trespass and other land-use violations under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 159 But it also broadened the scope of
Bivens's "step two" even further. At issue in Wilkie was whether land-
owners had, inter alia, a private action for damages under Bivens against
Bureau of Land Management federal officers accused of harassment and
intimidation.' 60 In step one of his Bivens analysis, Justice Souter found
that an alternative damages remedy existed for the landowners. 161 This
recognition in and of itself was sufficient to defeat a Bivens action; the
Malesko Court indeed terminated the analysis at that point.1 62 But when
Justice Souter turned to an unnecessary Bivens "step two"-the special-
factors doctrine-he declined to focus his analysis on congressional par-
ticipation and instead held that the Court must weigh "reasons for and
against the creation of a new cause of action, the way common law judges
have always done."'1 6 3 The Wilkie Court went on to balance the compet-
ing interests of the landowners and the government officials and con-
cluded that, "[t]he point here is not to deny that Government employees
sometimes overreach, for of course they do, and they may have done so
here if all the allegations are true. The point is the reasonable fear that a
general Bivens cure would be worse than the disease. ' 164 Finally, in far-
reaching language suggesting that there are even times when the violation
of a right does not warrant a remedy, Justice Souter noted that "any dam-
ages remedy for actions by Government employees who push too hard
for the Government's benefit may come better, if at all, throughlegislation."' 165
The Malesko and Wilkie Courts' departure from Bivens's 1980s prog-
eny cannot be overstated. 166 In balancing policy considerations, the Court
adopted a newly "open-ended special factors methodology," both "un-
manageable" and "inconsistent with a reasonable concept of separation
of powers. ' 167 Professor Tribe also makes the insightful point that this
methodology "has been exercised to the detriment of Fifth Amendment
rights peculiarly in need of the protection that only a Bivens remedy
could have ensured.' 68 This perhaps explains how violations of substan-
159. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561-62 (2007).
160. Id. at 541. Also at issue was whether the landowners had a claim under the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006). Wil-
kie, 553 U.S. at 541. The Court also declined to recognize relief under RICO. Id.
161. Id. at 553.
162. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74.
163. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 553.
164. Id. at 561.
165. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
166. See Tribe, supra note 144, at 70.
167. Id. at 70-71 (citing Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages
Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1151 (1989)).
168. Id. at 71.
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tive due process under the Fifth Amendment arising from unlawful de-
tention and extraordinary rendition have gone without a remedy. If this is
the case-and in this author's opinion, it is-then Professor Tribe's strong
analysis throws into sharp relief how the judiciary's reluctance to recog-
nize a cause of action for rights violations committed during the war on
terror is wholly divorced from Justice Harlan's separation of powers
based Bivens concurrence. This hesitation comes from a newly minted
post-September 11th interest-based approach instead. 16 9
What does all this mean for a terrorist suspect pursuing relief under
Bivens? To put it succinctly, even if an al Qaeda operative can show that
federal officers have violated some type of constitutional right-a rather
significant assumption by itself 17 0-the alleged terrorist will still have to
prove that no "special factors" counsel against an extension of Bivens
under the particular circumstances of the case. But conducting this Bivens
analysis can be daunting and uncomfortable for judges in the absence of a
coherent special-factors doctrine. As the Supreme Court distanced itself
from the separation of powers principles evident in the 1980s and moved
to a more interest-based approach in the twenty-first century, these "un-
manageable" and "inconsistent" messages imply that special-factors in-
quiries are no longer limited to questions as to whether a court can create
a damages remedy. They now include whether a court should.
At first blush, this transition from a positive to a normative assessment
invites judicial interference into the political sphere. Indeed, the holdings
in Malesko and Wilkie say not what the law is, but rather what the law
should be. 171 But upon closer examination, this new approach does just
the opposite: it invites political interference into the judicial sphere.1 72
Part II next examines how this twenty-first century interest-based ap-
proach to the creation of non-statutory damages remedies manifested in
the ill-defined national security exception to Bivens. It traces the excep-
tion's expansion and explains how, by favoring policy considerations over
separation of powers principles, courts unwittingly have given complete
executive deference to the creation of a damages remedy-in defiance of
nearly forty-years of Bivens jurisprudence.
II. MEASURING BY QUANTUM OF COMPETENCE
This part uses the application of the national security exception in Arar
v. Ashcroft as a tool to analyze amorphous national security concerns
within the Bivens national security exception. The Second Circuit in Arar
held that violations of substantive due process under the Fifth Amend-
169. Drawing on other aspects of Justice Harlan's concurrence, I explore infra Part
III.A how this post-September 11th approach may not be entirely inconsistent with separa-
tion of powers principles.
170. This is especially true if the alleged injuries occurred outside the Constitution's
reach. Compare Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950) with Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
171. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
172. See Tribe, supra note 144, at 71-72.
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ment are not actionable under Bivens.17 3 Maher Arar, a dual Canadian-
Syrian national, alleged that federal agents identified him as a member of
al Qaeda, subjected him to harsh interrogation and detention in the
United States, and later flew him to Amman, Jordan, where Jordanian
authorities turned him over to Syrian military officials to be tortured pur-
suant to the federal government's "extraordinary rendition" program.
174
One year later, Syrian authorities released Arar into the custody of Cana-
dian diplomats in Damascus upon request by the Canadian
government. 175
Arar brought suit in federal court and sought Bivens damages from the
federal officers he claimed were responsible for violating his Fifth
Amendment rights.176 The Second Circuit, however, refused to recognize
an implied cause of action and focused its analysis on the special factors
that counseled against the creation of damages remedy.17 7 As the court
proceeded in its Bivens analysis, the majority panel considered increas-
ingly executive-oriented spheres of interest and incorporated them as
special factors. 178 First, the majority panel noted that an interference with
U.S. foreign policy would counsel against the creation of a damages rem-
edy. 179 Second, the court explained that meddling with "our country's re-
lations with foreign powers," likewise would "stay [the court's] hand. 180
And third, the court considered an executive privilege-the state-secrets
privilege-as a special factor.181
The Arar court's analysis is a microcosm for an expanding national se-
curity exception as defined by the Executive. This part uses this expan-
sion to measure special factors by their quantum of competence. Or in
other words, by analyzing to what extent Congress, the political branch
entrusted with the institutional competence to create private rights of ac-
tion and prescribe remedies, participates in the decision-making process,
this part deconstructs the national security exception to Bivens in an ef-
fort to understand which national security matters should-and should
not-be considered special factors.
A. CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS-TEXTUAL
The primary reason the Arar court denied Bivens relief was that the
results of its special-factors analysis revealed that its creation of a dam-
173. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2008).
174. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
175. Id. at 255.
176. Id. at 257.
177. Arar, 532 F.3d at 181-83.
178. Id. The court also noted that "this action involves the intersection of removal deci-
sions and national security" and treated this observation as a special factor. d. at 183. The
court went on to explain, however, that this type of relationship would "implicate our rela-
tions with foreign powers." Id.
179. Id. at 181.
180. d. at 182 (citing Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J.)).
181. Id. at 182-83.
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ages remedy would intrude and interfere with foreign policy.182 The legis-
lative branch dominates the conduct of foreign policy-the
implementation of general principles by which a government is guided in
its management of or relations with another country' 83 -and legislators
are in the best position to determine whether a damages remedy should
exist. Or to capture it in the context of this Comment, Congress exhibits
the highest degree of institutional competence to fashion remedial relief,
and therefore, when the Legislature exercises greater control over a na-
tional security decision, courts should treat these matters as special
factors.
The Constitution textually commits a wide-range of foreign policy deci-
sion to Congress. Under the enumerated powers in Article I, Congress
may "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," "establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization," "define and punish Piracies and Felonies com-
mitted on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," and
"declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water."'1 84 The Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee is charged with leading foreign-policy legislation and de-
bate in the Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Foreign Affairs has exclusive jurisdiction over oversight and legislation
relating to "national security developments affecting foreign policy."'1 85
Several Supreme Court pronouncements also inform congressional tex-
tual control over foreign affairs. Over a century ago, in Chae Chan Ping
v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), the Court held that Con-
gress's control over immigration arises from its foreign policy powers.186
In Pfizer Inc. v. India, the Court declined to address an issue regarding a
foreign government's disparate treatment under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act because "that task is properly one for Congress particu-
larly in light of the sensitive political nature and foreign policy implica-
tions of the question."'1 87 And to echo Chief Justice John Roberts in
Boumediene v. Bush, the "American people," who select their represent-
atives to Congress, lost "a bit more control over the conduct of this Na-
tion's foreign policy to unelected, politically unaccountable judges."'1 8 8
Congressional action can dominate national security matters implicat-
ing foreign policy in a Bivens analysis. The D.C. district court in In re Iraq
and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, for example, denied non-statutory
damages to foreign nationals detained in Iraq partly because it would re-
quire "inquiring into the propriety of specific interrogation techniques
182. Id. at 181.
183. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 719, 1276 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "foreign" and
"policy").
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
185. U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, http://www.internationalrelations.
house.gov/about.asp?nav=jurisdiction&sec=jurisdiction (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
186. 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
187. 434 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1978).
188. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2293 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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and detention practices employed by the military while prosecuting
wars." 189 Relying on United States v. Stanley, the court noted that "con-
gressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is in-
appropriate."' 90 Having already established that the Congress enjoys
plenary power over the military, the court properly considered interfering
with the implementation of textually committed foreign policy as a spe-
cial factor under Bivens.191
B. EXECUTIVE CONTROL OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS-INHERENT
The Arar court also identified national security decisions involving for-
eign relations as special factors under Bivens.192 The majority panel noted
that, "[tihere can be no doubt that litigation of this sort would interfere
with the management of our country's relations with foreign powers and
affect our government's ability to ensure national security."'1 93 But ana-
lyzing the quantum of competence in this grey zone can be challenging:
foreign relations powers are "not expressly allocated by the Constitution,
and the division of authority between Congress and the President in re-
spect of them is not clearly defined.1194 Because the Executive has the
"vast [but not exclusive] share of responsibility for the conduct of our
foreign relations,"'195 courts need to look more searchingly to determine
to what extent Congress participates in foreign relations decisions impli-
cating national security.
In 1936, the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. held that the president possesses "plenary and exclusive power" to
conduct foreign relations and that this inherent power is not dependent
upon congressional delegation. 196 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, acting
pursuant to a joint congressional resolution, placed an arms embargo on
U.S. shipments to warring South American countries. 19 7 The Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation violated the embargo and argued in defense
that the congressional resolution was an "invalid delegation of legislative
power to the executive."' 98 The Court, however, found it unnecessary
even to consider this contention and instead held that the president has
"broad discretion" within his inherent powers to conduct foreign
relations. 199
189. In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 107 (D.D.C. 2007).
190. Id. at 106 (quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987)).
191. Id. at 107.
192. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 182 (2d Cir. 2008).
193. Id.
194. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1 (1987).
195. Am. Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
196. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
197. Id. at 312-13.
198. Id. at 314.
199. See id. at 329. One year later the Court in United States v. Belmont took judicial
notice of President Roosevelt's recognition of the Soviet government, as the "Executive
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A shallow reading of Curtiss-Wright suggests that because the presi-
dent's power over foreign relations is "plenary," the Executive has abso-
lute authority in this field. 200 To frame it in the context of this Comment,
national security decisions implicating foreign relations would then have
a low quantum of competence, should not be considered as special fac-
tors, and a Bivens action may be allowed to move forward. At the oppo-
site end of the spectrum, indeed, the Supreme Court in Chappell and
Stanley and the district court in In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Liti-
gation refused to extend Bivens relief precisely because Congress enjoys
"plenary control" over military discipline.
But Congress's plenary power vis-A-vis the military and the Executive's
"plenary power" vis-A-vis foreign relations is readily distinguishable: the
Constitution itself textually awards the Legislature control over military
discipline;20 1 the recognition of presidential plenary power in foreign re-
lations is both enhanced and contracted by judicial fiat. To be sure, the
Court's own language in Curtiss-Wright cabins its scope: foreign relations
"like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordina-
tion to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. '20 2 Subsequent judi-
cial decisions and the observations of noted scholars demonstrate how
this "subordination" to the Constitution accommodated Congress's role
in foreign relations.
After Curtiss-Wright, for example, the Supreme Court20 3 and several
circuits2°4 re-adopted an earlier view, found in Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co., that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-the polit-
ical'-departments of the government. '20 5 The Court in Oetjen held that
the political branches' designations of sovereignty are immune from judi-
cial review, and later decisions applied this observation to articulate the
modern political question doctrine,2 06 to define the act of state doc-
trine,20 7 and to hold that the president may comply with an international
had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government." United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1947).
200. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319-20.
201. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300-01 (1983). "In drafting the Constitution...[the Framers'] response was an explicit grant of plenary authority to Congress 'To raise and
support Armies'; 'To provide and maintain a Navy'; and 'To make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."' Id. (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8,
cls. 12-14).
202. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319-20.
203. Infra notes 206-08.
204. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 154, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that a foreign relations
decisions committed to the political branches counsel against a Bivens remedy); Corrie v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 504 F.2d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a cause of action against an
Israeli bull-dozing company was a nonjusticiable political question).
205. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
206. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 n.31 (1962).
207. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766 (1972)
(holding that "[t]he act of state doctrine is grounded on judicial concern" that an applica-
tion of common law "to judge the acts of a foreign sovereign might frustrate the conduct of
foreign relations by the political branches"); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
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treaty obligation absent implementing congressional legislation, but only
so long as those means "are consistent with the Constitution. '2 08 And as
Dean Harold Hongju Koh pointed out in his 1990 book, when it comes to
the Executive's power in foreign relations implicating national security:
[The Constitution] assigns to the president the predominant role in
the process, but affords him only a limited realm of exclusive powers,
with regard to diplomatic relations and negotiations and to the rec-
ognition of nations and governments. Outside of that realm, govern-
mental decisions regarding foreign affairs must transpire within a
sphere of concurrent authority, under presidential management, but
bounded by the checks provided by congressional consultation and
judicial review. 20 9
Bivens actions arising out of the Executive's inherent control over for-
eign affairs highlight the difficulty in ascertaining how much Congress
participates in the national security matters implicating foreign relations.
For instance, the D.C. Circuit in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, the case
upon which the Arar court grounded its reasoning that foreign relations
concerns operate as special factors, refused to recognize a cause of action
for Nicaraguans who brought claims against U.S. government officials for
supporting the Contras.2 10 Then-Judge Scalia concluded that "the special
needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the creation of damage
remedies. '21 ' The "special needs" as "special factors" included President
Ronald Reagan and various cabinet-level officials providing financial and
political support to Nicaraguan rebels in contravention of the Boland
Amendments, enactments which repeatedly denied the President's re-
quest for financial assistance to support the Contras.2 12 By attempting to
restrict U.S. support to the Nicaraguan rebels, Congress played a role in
the foreign relations decisions implicated in this Bivens action; their re-
fusal to appropriate funds precipitated the Executive's back-door support
of the Contras. But the extent of Congress's participation here-and con-
sequentially whether the quantum of competence was sufficient to defeat
a Bivens claim-is perhaps for the reader to decide.
C. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
The gravamen of the special factors examination in Arar was a fear that
the court's creation of a damages remedy would interfere with the politi-
cal branches' conduct of foreign policy. 213 But the court also considered
that "the government's assertion of the state-secrets privilege in this liti-
gation constitutes a further special factor counseling us to hesitate before
208. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371 (2008).
209. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 69 (1990) (emphasis added).
210. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 205; see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1081 (2008).
213. See supra Part II.A.
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creating a new cause of action or recognizing one. '214 By erroneously
considering an executive privilege as a special factor,215 the Arar court
strayed from separation of powers principles, balanced policy interests
instead, and unduly invited executive intrusion in the judicial sphere.
Although the use of the state-secrets privilege necessarily implicates
national security, unlike the congressional textual or the executive inher-
ent control over foreign affairs, it is wholly within the province of the
executive branch: the department that controls the matter of the case has
unconditional authority over its assertion, there is no congressional over-
sight over its invocation, and courts have increasingly considered it to be
"absolute. 2 16 The Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds formally
recognized the state-secrets privilege as a narrowly construed common-
law evidentiary rule and held that when "the occasion for the privilege is
appropriate the court should not jeopardize the security which the privi-
lege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence,
even by the judge alone. '217 The privilege, therefore, derives from a de-
cidedly non-constitutional source, the judicially created inherent execu-
tive foreign affairs power. And since Reynolds, it has been the judicial-
not the legislative-branch that has broadened this rule to include mili-
tary secrets, diplomatic relations, and intelligence sources.21 8
There is little need to discuss the extent of Congress's participation in
the assertion of an executive privilege. There is none. And because the
political branches share in national security determinations, 21 9 the anom-
aly inherent in the state-secrets privilege has not gone unnoticed by the
nation's lawmaking body. 220 The proposed State-Secrets Protection Act
of 2009 aims at "help[ing] guide the courts to balance the Government's
interests in secrecy with accountability and the rights of citizens to seek
214. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). The govern-
ment moved to dismiss the action at the district court level by asserting the state-secrets
privilege over information relating to the alleged Fifth Amendment violations. See Arar v.
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 286-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
215. Kristina A. Kiik, Note, Damages Against Federal Officers-The Second Circuit
Contributes to Executive Interference in National Security Litigation Through Improper
Bivens Analysis, 62 SMU L. REV. 813, 817 (2009).
216. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1953) (collecting cases); Chesney,
supra note 38, at 1271.
217. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. But see Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d
992, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the government's assertion of the state-secrets privilege
in an extraordinary rendition case).
218. See Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope
Through Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 106 & n.47 (2007) (collecting
cases).
219. See supra note 32.
220. Several scholars and the American Bar Association also have urged Congress to
clarify or codify the state-secrets privilege. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Na-
tional Security Information, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 219, 220-21 (2008); Victor Hansen, Ex-
traordinary Renditions and the State Secrets Privilege: Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand,
33 N.C. J. INr'L L. & COM. REG. 629, 641, 653 app. (2008). To date, however, Congress has
not enacted such legislation. Cf. State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong.
(2009); State Secret Protection Act of 2009, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009).
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judicial redress. ' 22 1 This law would prevent the Executive from asserting
the privilege until the court conducts a hearing to determine whether ma-
terial information must not be disclosed. 222 Senator Ted Kennedy, a co-
sponsor of the 2008 version of the bill, expressed concern that repeated
invocations of the state-secrets privilege "impair[ ] the ability of Congress
and the judiciary to perform their constitutional duty to check executive
power." 223
Senator Kennedy's assessment is accurate, and this evaluation, among
other things224 makes the consideration of an executive privilege as a spe-
cial factor under Bivens particularly inappropriate. The state-secrets priv-
ilege is a presidential tool, and when treated as a special factor, the court
defers not to a congressional determination, but to an executive determi-
nation of whether a cause of action under Bivens should exist. In other
words, the Arar court did not give the Executive's view of a case's impact
on foreign policy "serious weight" when it considered the state-secrets
privilege as a special factor.2 25 On the contrary, the court, the traditional
guardian of individual rights against the political branches, allowed the
Executive to override the potential for constitutional remedies based
solely on a judicially manufactured, non-statutory executive privilege. By
granting the executive branch the unilateral power to block remedies
stemming from egregious rights violations committed in the war on ter-
ror, the court not only emptied without justification the fundamental and
longstanding legal maxim, "where there is a right, there is a remedy,
2 26
but also another fundamental and longstanding principle: "[n]o man is
allowed to be a judge in his own cause. 227
This part deconstructed the national security exception to Bivens by
measuring national security decisions by their quantum of institutional
competence. It distinguished amorphous national security concerns by
objectively assessing Congress's involvement in a national security mat-
ter. This part also demonstrated how, by sacrificing separation of powers
principles in favor of interest-based policy determinations, the judiciary
permitted the gross expansion of political interference in the judicial
sphere, much to the detriment of safeguarding essential liberties. The re-
mainder of this Comment will now propose a way to conduct a Bivens
analysis during the war on terror that brings courts back to their primary
duty-to vindicate constitutional rights.
221. State Secret Protection Act of 2009, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009).
222. Id.; see also 155 CONG. REC. S2155 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
223. 154 CONG. REC. S201 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
224. See Kiik, supra note 215, at 817-19.
225. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 182-83 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 733 n.21 (2004)).
226. Supra note 6.
227. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). "With equal, nay with greater reason, a
body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time .. " Id.
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III. THE BIVENS NATIONAL SECURITY
EXCEPTION CONTINUUM
The purpose of the Bivens national security exception continuum is
two-fold: first, it separates out and distinguishes amorphous national se-
curity concerns, and second, it balances competing interests during the
war on terror. It thereby honors the original intent of Bivens as a function
of separations of powers principles228 and at the same time seizes upon
the new-found interest-based approach courts have adopted under the
special-factors doctrine.229 And perhaps most importantly, the continuum
offers a way to balance within Bivens's unique framework national secur-
ity concerns with individual rights, even during times of national
challenge:
THE BIVENS NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION CONTINUUM
high low
quantum of competence quantum of competence
congressional control over executive control over
foreign affairs foreign affairs
By now, the way the continuum works should be clear: when courts
consider whether violations of constitutional rights committed by federal
officers in the course of the war on terror are actionable under Bivens,
they must examine any potential special factors counseling hesitation by
quantum of competence. If congressional action dominates a national se-
curity decision, as is true when the Legislature alone takes action, then
there exists a high quantum of competence. 230 It is then more likely that
a special factor counseling hesitation exists and Bivens relief should be
denied. But when executive action dominates a national security matter,
as is true when the government invokes the state-secrets privilege, it is
then less likely that a court should consider the matter a special factor
under Bivens.231 The Executive lacks the institutional competence to
228. Supra Part I.B.
229. Supra Part I.C.
230. Cf. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1026-27 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("Therefore, the
[c]ourt finds that the [c]ongressional determination to vest authority and discretion with
the President in the designation of enemy combatants under the AUMF does not consti-
tute a special factor barring judicial review of such designations."). This joint-congres-
sional resolution is just that, a congressional resolution. As I explain throughout this
Comment, Congress has the greatest institutional competence to fashion remedial relief,
and accordingly, courts should consider congressionally dominated national security deci-
sions as special factors. In passing the AUMF, Congress was not merely the dominant
participant in the national security decision-indeed it was the sole actor. See Pub. L. No.
107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The Padilla court should have considered it a special
factor.
231. For the same reasons, the Padilla court properly determined that "the decision to
designate, detain, and interrogate Padilla as an enemy combatant.., made pursuant to the
AUMF's explicit grant of authority to the President from Congress" and arguments that
essentially amounted to an invocation of the state-secrets privilege were not special factors
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confer or deny a damages remedy. The middle of the continuum repre-
sents the foreign affairs powers shared by the Executive and the Legisla-
ture within the national security context. Here exists an internal check-
and-balances, or as Dean Koh calls it, a "concurrent authority," which
guards against one branch or the other from dominating the decision-
making process. Consequentially, ascertaining whether Congress or the
Executive exercises greater control requires a bit more scrutiny.232
under Bivens. See Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1027-28. First, the AUMF itself and its delega-
tion of power to the president are, as the court accurately distinguished, two very different
potential special factors. Id. at 1026-28; supra note 41. As I explained supra note 230, the
AUMF alone is purely a legislative function. But its delegation of authority to the presi-
dent expanded the Executive's inherent control over foreign affairs, thereby placing this
special factor to the right-side of the Bivens national security exception continuum. The
closer a national security matter is to a purely executive function, the less likely it should
be considered a special factor. Here, the district court's Bivens analysis was right on point:
the executive-centric national security matter rightly did not counsel against the recogni-
tion of Padilla's constitutional claims.
Second, the Padilla court correctly dismissed Yoo's "contention that the secret nature of
his advice, because it may affect national security, constitute[d] a 'special factor counseling
hesitation' precluding judicial review." Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 n.1. The court de-
termined this argument was comparable to an assertion of the state-secrets privilege. Id. at
1028. Because the consideration of the state-secrets privilege as a special factor is "tanta-
mount to complete executive deference to the creation of a damages remedy, which defies
nearly forty-years of Bivens jurisprudence," Kiik, supra note 215, at 818, the court correctly
rejected Yoo's argument that the effect Padilla's case would have on national security
should prevent his Bivens action from moving forward.
232. It is difficult to measure quantum of institutional competence when a Bivens action
implicates foreign relations concerns stemming from the Executive's inherent control over
foreign affairs. See supra Part II.B. Padilla v. Yoo is no exception. The fourth and final
national security matter the Padilla court considered in its special-factor analysis was the
effect the case would have on foreign affairs and foreign relations. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d
at 1029-30. Like the Second Circuit in Arar v. Ashcroft, the California district court turned
to Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan for guidance on what might be considered a special factor.
Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1029; see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 182 (2d Cir. 2008).
And, as in Arar, the Padilla court quoted then-judge Scalia that "the special needs of for-
eign affairs must stay our hand in the creation of damages remedies." Arar, 532 F.3d at 182;
Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 (quoting Sanchez-Espinosa v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209
(D.C. Cir. 1985)). But in evaluating whether national security concerns about foreign rela-
tions should bar the creation of a Bivens remedy, the district court in Padilla and the appel-
late court in Arar- relying on the same case and on the same quote-reached opposite
results: the former was not "persuaded by the decisions not to find a Bivens remedy in
instances in which foreign nationals [were] allegedly subjected to unconstitutional treat-
ment abroad," Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1029, while the latter found that "[tihere can be
no doubt that litigation of this sort would interfere with the management of our country's
relations with foreign powers and affect our government's ability to ensure national secur-
ity," Arar, 532 F.3d at 182. Padilla distinguished its special-factors analysis from Arar and
Sanchez-Espinosa on citizenship and territorial grounds: Bivens action involving foreign
nationals and the judicial intrusion into the affairs of foreign governments had no applica-
tion to the instant case involving an American citizen on American soil. Padilla, 633 F.
Supp. 2d at 1030; see also Arar, 532 F.3d at 181-82.
Space constraints do not permit a more comprehensive analysis of Sanchez-Espinosa,
Arar, and Padilla. My limited purpose here instead is to emphasize that when the Execu-
tive and the Legislature enjoy "concurrent authority" over national security decisions-
decisions, for example, that involve the treatment of foreign nationals vis-a-vis U.S. citi-
zens-the quantum of institutional competence that potential special factor exhibits may
not be self-evident. Courts must therefore closely examine whether the executive or legis-
lative branch exercises greater authority over these national security matters when con-
ducting a Bivens analysis.
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A. SYNTHESIZING THE SPECIAL-FACTORS DOCTRINE
The theory behind this proposed balancing approach is equally as im-
portant as the mechanics. The Bivens national security exception contin-
uum offers a special-factors methodology that permits the judiciary to
follow separation of powers principles while concomitantly "weighing
reasons for and against the creation of a new cause of action, the way
common law judges have always done. ' '233 Contrary to what Professor
Tribe may suggest, the interest-based balancing approach of today and
the separations of power principles of yesterday are not mutually exclu-
sive. 234 Being able to synthesize both methods provides unified guidance
in the absence of a coherent special-factors doctrine.
B. RETURNING TO BIVENS'S ORIGINAL INTENT
The continuum first and foremost harkens back to the separation of
powers principles so clearly apparent in Bivens and its early progeny. As
the original manifestations of Bivens relief required congressional defer-
ence to the creation of a damages remedy, by separating national security
concerns by quantum of competence, the continuum redirects the courts'
focus to examining "the question of who should decide whether such a
remedy should be provided. '235 In this way, the balancing mechanism ad-
dresses Professor Vladeck's second concern with the national security ex-
ception: it eliminates executive deference to the creation of a damages of
remedy.236 Because the Executive lacks the institutional competence to
manufacture private rights of action and prescribe remedies, executive-
centric national security concerns should not be considered as special fac-
tors under Bivens. This approach reaffirms that not even the Executive
may violate the Constitution during war, that the president may not uni-
laterally deny the enforcement of a constitutional right, and that no man
may be a judge in his own cause.
C. CAPITALIZING ON INTEREST-BASED BALANCING
Offering a methodology courts might find regressive rather than pro-
gressive will have little positive impact in balancing Bivens during the war
on terror. Built within the continuum, therefore, is a policy-based ap-
proach courts may be more willing to follow in this time of national chal-
lenge. Balancing methods have proved effective in protecting
constitutional rights in the past, and thus it is likely that this technique
will prove equally successful.
It should be no coincidence that while Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Bivens provided instructions as to how the separation of powers should
figure into a Bivens analysis, it also offers insight as to how an interest-
233. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 554 (2007).
234. Supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
235. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380, 389 (1983).
236. See Vladeck, supra note 38, at 5.
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based balancing methodology may be, at least in part, compatible with
the special-factors doctrine. Justice Harlan reasoned in Bivens "that the
range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as
broad as the range [that] a legislature would consider with respect to an
express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy. ' 237 To be clear,
after weighing the relevant policies in Bivens, he agreed with the major-
ity's conclusion that the government had not advanced any substantial
policy consideration against the recognition of a remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations.238
Taking Justice Harlan's reasoning into account, the Bivens national se-
curity exception continuum approach aptly reconciles his separation of
powers principles with his moderate interest-based policy considerations.
To illustrate, either the existence of an alternative damages remedy or the
purposeful choice not to create one indicates that Congress has con-
trolled the decision-making process. When Congress controls the deci-
sion-making process in a national security matter, the potential special
factor exhibits high quantum of competence. It therefore follows that
purposeful congressional action or inaction should be considered in a
Bivens analysis. So long as Congress has neither provided a remedy nor
explicitly prohibited against one,239 the judiciary may adopt an interest-
based policy approach to determine how to weigh that special factor
against the recognition of an implied cause of action. In this way, even
when congressional inaction-a special factor exhibiting high quantum of
competence and thus requiring consideration-is evident, a Bivens rem-
edy may still be appropriate. 240
This process assuages Professor Vladeck's first and third concerns that
the national security exception "lend[s] a judicial sanction to even the
most shocking government conduct in the name of national defense.",
241
First, congressional inaction to the creation of a damages remedy for un-
lawful detention and extraordinary rendition has not been inadvertent:
Congress has twice issued legislation addressing detainee treatment with-
out creating a private cause of action for those injured by federal offi-
cials. 242 But Congress also has not explicitly prohibited remedies for
these violations either. And the Supreme Court has never suggested that
congressional inaction prohibits an extension of Bivens;243 indeed, there
237. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
238. Id. at 407-08.
239. Supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
241. See Vladeck, supra note 38, at 5.
242. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163,
119 Stat. 3136, 3474-75 (2006); Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1811, 2068-71 (2004).
243. Cf. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1988). "The absence of statutory
relief for a constitutional violation, for example, does not by any means necessarily imply




would be no such thing as a Bivens remedy if that were the rule.244 The
congressional inaction present under these circumstances indicates that
there is a high quantum of competence, this inaction should be consid-
ered a special factor, and courts are free to balance it as a concern they
may find important to the creation of a damages remedy.
In the same vein, this process alleviates Professor Vladeck's third con-
cern that the national security exception "eviscerate[s]" Bivens's role as a
deterrent. 245 The Court in Malesko indicated that the deterrence factor
should figure into a Bivens analysis, and Justice Souter reached this con-
clusion using an interest-based policy approach. 246 Purposeful congres-
sional inaction increases the likelihood that federal officers may violate
constitutional rights because there is no enforcement mechanism. Be-
cause Congress through its inaction has dominated this national security
matter, balancing special factors like this with a high quantum of compe-
tence allows for the consideration that a Bivens remedy may be proper
specifically to deter government officials from endangering the protection
of the very constitutional rights "for which we fight abroad. ''247
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment has been to propose a way to balance
Bivens during the war on terror. The national security exception contin-
uum offers a methodology firmly grounded in both traditional and mod-
ern incarnations of the special-factors doctrine. But critics may suggest
that the foregoing analysis is merely an ambitious academic exercise into
the obscure nuances of Bivens relief with little pragmatic value. Suffice to
say, any Bivens action lodged by a terrorist suspect would likely involve
special factors pertaining to the congressional textual control or the exec-
utive inherent control over foreign affairs,248 and even under the contin-
uum approach, the judicial creation of a damages remedy would be
improper. But such an outcome-orientated criticism is short-sighted. To
turn a truism on its head, the ends do not justify the means-the means
justify the ends. The process by which courts reach the decision whether
to extend Bivens relief is equally as important as the decision itself.
As this Comment went to press, the Second Circuit in Arar v. Ashcroft
affirmed en banc the district court's refusal to extend Bivens relief.249
This decision "recognized [the judiciary's] limited competence, authority,
and jurisdiction to make rules or set parameters to govern the practice
called rendition" because courts "can easily locate that competence, ex-
pertise, and responsibility elsewhere: in Congress. '250 Accordingly, the
244. See Vladeck, supra note 38, at 5.
245. Id.
246. Supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
247. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004).
248. See supra Part II.A-B.
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proposed Bivens national security exception continuum approach, a func-
tion of Congress's participation in a national security matter, is not only a
more balanced way to conduct a Bivens analysis for injuries arising from
the war on terror, but also a process encouraged by at least one court. In
light of this Second Circuit ruling, this Comment's analysis is more rele-
vant than ever.
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